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Protect Me From Myself: Determining Competency to 
Waive the Right to Counsel During Civil-Commitment 
Proceedings in Washington State 
Jacob J. Stender∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendant1 J.S. was found incompetent to stand trial in a criminal 
proceeding and detained for seventy-two hours in a mental-health facility 
for further evaluation.2 Prior to the end of the detainment period, doctors 
from the facility treating J.S. filed a petition to require him to be treated 
involuntarily for up to ninety days.3 Upon hearing of the civil-
commitment4 petition, J.S. requested to represent himself pro se, express-
ly stating to the court, “Yes, I would like to [represent myself].”5 The 
judge then conducted a brief colloquy6 with J.S. but asked only questions 
pertaining to J.S.’s legal experience and training.7 
                                                            
∗ J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Psychology, Western Washington 
University, 2002. I would like to thank Ethan Rogers for his insightful feedback on the topic of civil 
commitment. I would also like to express my gratitude to the staff of the Seattle University Law 
Review for their tireless efforts to make this Comment as perfect and polished as possible. Any er-
rors and opinions expressed herein are my own, unless otherwise indicated. 
 1. Since the proceedings are civil in nature, parties subject to civil commitment are designated 
as respondents. But because a great deal of law regarding self-representation stems from criminal 
proceedings, and because the designation “respondent” switches depending on which party appeals a 
trial-court decision, parties subject to civil-commitment proceedings are herein referred to as “de-
fendants.” 
 2. State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Civil commitment is a civil proceeding in which involuntary evaluation or treatment is 
sought for a particular individual. “Commitment” is defined as “the determination by a court that a 
person should be detained for a period of either evaluation or treatment, or both, in an inpatient or a 
less-restrictive setting.” WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.010(2) (2012). 
 5. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 437–38. 
 6. A “colloquy” is “[a]ny formal discussion, such as an oral exchange between a judge, the 
prosecutor, the defense counsel, and a criminal defendant in which the judge ascertains the defend-
ant’s understanding of the proceedings and of the defendant’s rights.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
300 (9th ed. 2009). 
 7. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 438. 
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Upon conclusion of the colloquy, the court found that J.S. was not 
able to represent himself, but it made no specific holding that J.S. was 
unable to waive his right to counsel due to incompetency.8 The court also 
made no findings as to the reason it determined that J.S. was not able to 
represent himself.9 After ruling on J.S.’s request, the trial court received 
expert testimony that J.S. suffered from antisocial personality disorder 
and a cognitive disorder, with schizophrenia to be ruled out.10 The court 
also was given information about J.S.’s three previous hospitalizations 
during the preceding three years.11 In his own testimony, J.S. admitted to 
suffering from a cognitive disorder, and while he contended that the dis-
order manifested primarily in the form of physical symptoms, he also 
admitted that it resulted in memory problems.12 
On appeal, J.S. claimed that the court’s refusal to allow him to 
waive his right to counsel and represent himself violated his rights under 
the Washington constitution.13 The appellate court found that the consti-
tutional right to self-representation applied to defendants in civil-
commitment proceedings.14 The appellate court also recognized that 
Washington courts had not addressed the standard for determining the 
competency of a party seeking to exercise the right to self-
representation.15 
After reviewing the standards that other states use to make compe-
tency determinations, the court declined to articulate a comprehensive 
standard to be applied in future cases.16 The court was reluctant to articu-
late a standard because it had held that the matter before it was moot; J.S. 
had completed his involuntary treatment and had been released from the 
hospital prior to the appellate court’s ruling.17 The appellate court did not 
further address the procedure for determining competency for two rea-
sons: first, there was no relief the court could provide to J.S., and second, 
the issue of what procedure to use had not been litigated or resolved dur-
ing the trial-court proceeding.18 The court also did not consider the type 
                                                            
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 442. It appeared to the appellate court that the determination was based on the collo-
quy with J.S., not on J.S.’s prior mental-health treatment or evaluation. Id. at 442 n.8. 
 10. Id. at 438. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 440. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 441. 
 16. Id. at 443 n.12. 
 17. Id. at 439. 
 18. Id. at 443. 
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of colloquy that should be used to ensure the validity of a party’s waiver 
of the right to counsel.19 
Articulating a clear standard for determining competency to waive 
the right to counsel is paramount to the protection of defendants’ rights 
in civil-commitment proceedings. Such proceedings often involve de-
fendants who suffer from mental illnesses, and who are thus particularly 
susceptible to behavior that is irrational or against their best interests.20 
Without a clear method to ascertain whether a particular defendant is 
competent to waive counsel, there is an increased likelihood that incom-
petent defendants will be permitted to conduct their own defense without 
the aid of counsel. Additionally, defendants like J.S. who later contest a 
trial court’s ruling on competency often will not have any remedy avail-
able to them, as they will likely have completed their involuntary treat-
ment well before an appeal is heard.21 Only if courts have a comprehen-
sive evidentiary procedure to apply when determining the competency of 
defendants will defendants be assured that their rights will be respected. 
Washington State currently lacks a comprehensive standard to de-
termine the competency of civil defendants who seek to waive their right 
to counsel. Other states have also noted recently that the standard to be 
applied when determining competency in such situations remains un-
addressed.22 
This Comment argues that an unarticulated, heightened standard of 
competency to waive counsel, under which Washington currently oper-
ates, is the ideal standard to address the unique concerns that exist in civ-
il-commitment proceedings. This Comment clarifies the existing law 
governing the determination of a party’s right to waive counsel, as well 
as the determination of the validity of such a waiver. This Comment also 
articulates a comprehensive inquiry standard for trial courts, both within 
and outside of Washington, to apply when determining the competency 
                                                            
 19. Id. at 443 n.12. 
 20. While many people subject to civil commitment require involuntary treatment due to cog-
nitive disorders that may affect their ability to conduct their defense, some are committed for behav-
ioral and personality disorders that do not necessarily impact cognition. For example, “sexually 
violent predators” may be involuntarily committed pursuant to section 71.09.060 of the Washington 
Revised Code, despite the state legislature finding that these individuals may “not have a mental 
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for . . . short-term treatment [for] individuals with 
serious mental disorders.” WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.010 (2001). Thus, while there is a greater 
likelihood in civil-commitment proceedings that mental illness will affect a party’s ability to make 
decisions that are in his or her best interests, such an effect is not assured. 
 21. See, e.g., Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 443 (dismissing appeal because defendant had already 
completed his ninety-day civil commitment, leaving no available relief). 
 22. See Commonwealth v. DiGiampietro, No. 08-P-1849, 2009 WL 4110807, at *1 n.2 (Mass. 
App. Ct. Nov. 25, 2009). 
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of a party and the validity of a waiver. The goal of this express determi-
nation standard is to create from existing law a series of questions to be 
used during a colloquy between the trial judge and the party seeking to 
waive counsel, thus ensuring an adequate evidentiary record on which 
the court can base its determination. 
Part II of this Comment argues that under federal law, states can 
and should apply a standard for determining competency to waive coun-
sel in civil-commitment proceedings that is both unarticulated and strict-
er than the current standard for competency to stand trial. While Part III 
clarifies Washington State’s mandatory two-step determination regarding 
a defendant’s competency to waive counsel, Part IV argues that the de-
termination should be based on a one-step fact-finding inquiry. Lastly, 
Part V of this Comment outlines the exact manner in which trial courts 
should conduct their fact-finding inquiries. 
II. STANDARD OF COMPETENCY REQUIRED PURSUANT TO 
U.S. SUPREME COURT RULINGS 
The Sixth Amendment provides an accused with both a right to 
counsel and a right to self-representation.23 Courts have observed that 
these two rights are, by their nature, mutually exclusive, as an assertion 
of one requires a waiver of the other.24 This tension highlights the im-
portance of ensuring that an assertion or waiver of either right is made by 
a party that is competent to do so because two substantive constitutional 
rights are at issue. This Part summarizes the requirements for a waiver of 
the right to counsel under federal law, as well as the contemporary appli-
cation of those requirements. 
A. Requirements for an Effective Waiver of Counsel Under Federal Law 
A criminal defendant cannot waive the right to counsel unless com-
petent to do so.25 The requirement that defendants be competent in order 
to waive counsel and proceed pro se has been deemed necessary to pro-
tect defendants’ right to a fair trial.26 In addition to the requirement of 
competency, parties seeking to waive their right to counsel must do so 
“knowingly and intelligently.”27 Though the Supreme Court in Faretta v. 
                                                            
 23. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 (1975). 
 24. Miller v. C.S. (In re Interest of C.S.), 713 N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D. 2006). 
 25. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). 
 26. Jason R. Marks, State Competence Standards for Self-Representation in a Criminal Trial: 
Opportunity and Danger for State Courts After Indiana v. Edwards, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 825, 834 
(2010). 
 27. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
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California only alluded to an additional requirement that the waiver be 
made voluntarily,28 state courts have generally included such a require-
ment when determining the validity of a waiver.29 The requirement that 
waiver be made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly ensures that 
when defendants seek to relinquish the numerous benefits associated 
with the right to counsel, they do so by their own free and reasoned 
choice, and with a requisite level of knowledge of the rights relin-
quished.30 
The standard for mental competency to stand trial was originally ar-
ticulated in Dusky v. United States.31 This standard requires the trial court 
to determine “(1) whether the defendant has a rational as well as factual 
understanding of the proceedings against him and (2) whether the de-
fendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding.”32 The Dusky standard 
seems well-suited for determining the competency to stand trial, as it 
requires only that a defendant have some ability to interact with an attor-
ney and to understand the proceedings. But when applied as the standard 
for determining competency to waive the right to counsel, the Dusky 
standard fails to measure defendants’ mental fitness to conduct their own 
defense in a manner that will not infringe on their right to a fair trial.33 
In Godinez v. Moran, the Court expressly rejected the idea that 
competency to waive the right to counsel “must be measured by a stand-
ard that is higher than (or even different from) the Dusky standard.”34 
The Court qualified this statement by noting that “[s]tates are free to 
adopt competency standards that are more elaborate than the Dusky for-
mulation, [but] the Due Process Clause does not impose these additional 
requirements.”35 The Court stressed that the level of competency re-
quired of parties seeking to waive the right to counsel “is the competence 
                                                            
 28. Id. 
 29. See In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 686 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Interest of C.S., 713 N.W.2d 
at 547; Lanett v. State, 750 S.W.2d 302, 304 (Tex. App. 1988); State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 
P.3d 435, 442 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); S.Y. v. Eau Claire Cnty. (In re S.Y.), 457 N.W.2d 326, 328 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 30. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. 
 31. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). 
 32. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (internal quotation marks and italics omit-
ted) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). 
 33. See id. at 172 (noting the difference between the minimum constitutional requirement of 
the Dusky standard and a “somewhat higher standard that measures mental fitness for another legal 
purpose”). 
 34. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993). 
 35. Id. at 402. 
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to waive the right, not the competence to represent [themselves].”36 Ad-
ditionally, the Court found that while competency is required whenever 
the waiver of the right to counsel is asserted, “a competency determina-
tion is necessary only when a court has reason to doubt the [party]’s 
competence.”37 
In Indiana v. Edwards, the Court qualified the application of the 
Dusky standard by holding that “the Constitution permits States to insist 
upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial 
under Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point 
where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by them-
selves.”38 The Court recognized the possibility that a party could satisfy 
the Dusky standard by having the ability to work with counsel at trial, 
while at the same time being “unable to carry out the basic tasks needed 
to present his [or her] own defense without the help of counsel.”39 The 
Court distinguished Godinez from Edwards based on the fact that 
Godinez addressed the defendant’s right to proceed on his own to enter a 
guilty plea, rather than the more general right to self-representation.40 
The Court also distinguished Godinez because that case concerned a state 
court’s ability to permit a defendant to operate without counsel in a par-
ticular function, not a state’s ability to deny a defendant the ability to 
waive counsel.41 
Additionally, the Edwards Court held that “the Constitution permits 
judges to take realistic account of the particular defendant’s mental ca-
pacities by asking whether a defendant who seeks to conduct his own 
defense at trial is mentally competent to do so.”42 While it is unclear ex-
actly what the Court meant by “realistic account,” this holding necessari-
ly permits judges to conduct an inquiry into a party’s mental state and 
look to extrinsic evidence demonstrating that mental state. Without such 
                                                            
 36. Id. at 399. 
 37. Id. at 402 n.13. 
 38. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178 (italics added). While Edwards articulated only a “mental-
illness-related limitation on the scope of the self-representation right,” id. at 171, this Comment 
addresses only defendants in civil-commitment proceedings in which there is a substantial likelihood 
that defendants suffer from some type of mental illness or disorder for purposes of applying the 
Edwards limitation. See Marks, supra note 26, at 846 (arguing that the Edwards Court addressed 
only competency with regard to “severe mental illness” or “lack[] [of] mental capacity”). 
 39. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175–76. 
 40. The defendant in Godinez sought to change his pleas himself, not to conduct his own de-
fense. Id. at 173. Thus, his ability to conduct a defense at trial was not at issue, leaving the Court to 
consider the narrow issue of his “competence to waive the right” to counsel only with regard to entry 
of pleas. Id. 
 41. Id. at 173–74. 
 42. Id. at 177–78. 
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an inquiry, judges would be unaware of the mental capacities that they 
are to take into realistic account. 
Trial courts may now impose a standard of competency to waive 
counsel that exceeds the Dusky standard but only absent an express hold-
ing to the contrary by the state supreme court.43 If a trial court imposes a 
heightened standard, then that standard must simply comply with the 
minimal requirements of Edwards.44 Thus, a trial court could find de-
fendants incompetent where they “suffer from severe mental illness to 
the point when they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves.”45 
B. Application of Competency Standards Post-Edwards 
Despite the clarification of the law with regard to competency 
standards, little has changed in the manner that current standards are ap-
plied.46 As Dusky now stands for the minimum constitutional standard,47 
state courts and legislatures can define the standard for competency to 
waive counsel as either (1) the Dusky standard, (2) an unarticulated 
standard that is greater than the Dusky standard, or (3) an articulated 
standard that is greater than the Dusky standard.48 Prior to Edwards, 
many state courts applied the Dusky standard when determining a de-
fendant’s right to waive counsel.49 When a waiver of the right to counsel 
is sought, these courts are now free to articulate standards that consider a 
defendant’s mental capacity and illnesses.50 As yet, none have expressly 
done so.51 But the California Supreme Court did recently hold that trial 
                                                            
 43. See People v. Johnson, No. S188619, 2012 WL 254856, at *5 (Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (“Lower 
courts may decide questions of first impression, including the effect that subsequent events, such as 
a United States Supreme Court decision, have on decisions from a higher court, including this one. 
In this case, that authority includes deciding whether to accept the Edwards invitation.”). 
 44. Id. at *6. 
 45. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. 
 46. See Marks, supra note 26, at 843 (noting that no state courts have articulated an express 
standard for the determination of competency to waive counsel since Edwards). 
 47. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172. 
 48. Marks, supra note 26, at 836–37. 
 49. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 (Mass. 1999); see also State v. 
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 171–72 (Minn. 1997); Commonwealth v. Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1336 
(Pa. 1995). 
 50. A standard for competency remains unarticulated when a court or state requires a compe-
tency determination but declines “to delineate the components of representational competence.” E. 
Lea Johnson, Representational Competence: Defining the Limits of the Right to Self-Representation 
at Trial, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 523, 531 (2011). 
 51. Id. at 526 (noting that lower courts have yet to provide guidance for competency determi-
nations post-Edwards); see also Marks, supra note 26, at 843 (“[N]o state court in the post-Edwards 
era appears to have articulated a detailed standard of self-representation competence.” (italics add-
ed)). 
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courts may apply a heightened, though unarticulated, standard of compe-
tency.52 
The traditional Dusky standard does not sufficiently address the 
concerns expressed by the Edwards Court. Continuing to apply only the 
Dusky standard when making competency determinations would mini-
mize the chances of reversible error, as only defendants deemed unable 
to stand trial would be kept from representing themselves.53 But although 
this would be a safe approach for judges seeking to avoid having their 
rulings reversed, it would not be the best standard for ensuring that de-
fendants are not unfairly deprived of their right to a fair trial.54 Continu-
ing to apply the Dusky standard alone would simply allow judges to play 
it safe at the risk of permitting incompetent defendants to represent 
themselves. 
Applying a heightened but unarticulated standard for competency 
would allow courts the greatest amount of discretion, enabling case-by-
case determinations based on the particularities of different circumstanc-
es and defendants.55 The Edwards Court viewed this discretion as desira-
ble because trial judges “will often prove best able to make more fine-
tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circum-
stances of a particular defendant.”56 But such an unarticulated standard 
would also increase the chances of reversal on appeal, as appellate courts 
would have to review the discretionary rulings of the trial courts.57 Con-
versely, an articulated standard would serve to diminish the chances of 
reversible error by providing a clear standard for courts to apply,58 but 
                                                            
 52. People v. Johnson, No. S188619, 2012 WL 254856, at *6 (Cal. Jan. 30, 2012) (“At this 
point, at least, we also think it best not to adopt a more specific standard [for competency than the 
requirements of Edwards].”). The court notably rejected several articulated competency standards, 
including those proposed in law review articles by Jason R. Marks and Professor E. Lea Johnson. Id. 
at *5–6. See generally Johnson, supra note 50; Marks, supra note 26. Instead, the court stated: 
[P]ending further guidance from the high court, we believe the standard that trial courts 
considering exercising their discretion to deny self-representation should apply is simply 
whether the defendant suffers from a severe mental illness to the point where he or she 
cannot carry out the basic tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel. 
Johnson, 2012 WL 254856, at *6. 
 53. Marks, supra note 26, at 837–38. 
 54. Id. at 838. 
 55. Id. at 838–39. 
 56. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008). 
 57. Marks, supra note 26, at 839. 
 58. An articulated procedure for trial courts to follow in developing the factual record prior to 
ruling would also serve to diminish the likelihood of reversal. The likelihood of sufficiency would be 
maximized because by legislating or ordering a particular procedure, the legislature or the court 
would first engage in a fact-finding process and then find that the procedure will yield a sufficient 
evidentiary record on which a court could base its determination. Because the court or legislature 
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trial courts would lose some of their ability to tailor rulings to the specif-
ic facts of each case.59 
Concerns regarding reversible error, while compelling in the crimi-
nal context, are less important when applied to civil-commitment pro-
ceedings. If reversible error is found on appeal in criminal cases, the 
conviction is vacated, and the case is either dismissed or remanded for a 
new trial. Thus, emphasis is placed on strictly adhering to all constitu-
tionally mandated procedures to ensure that convictions are obtained 
while respecting the defendant’s rights, which minimizes the chances of 
reversal on appeal. 
In contrast, the paramount concern of trial courts in civil-
commitment proceedings must be to ensure that rulings are justified 
based on the particular facts of each case. Defendants in civil-
commitment proceedings generally have no available remedy on appeal, 
as their commitment will likely have ended before any appeal is heard.60 
Because there is no remedy available on appeal, courts cannot afford to 
focus primarily on a mere minimization of reversible errors. Trial courts 
hearing commitment matters have only one chance to arrive at the cor-
rect result, and they cannot afford to sacrifice any accuracy in their rul-
ings just to ensure that their rulings will be upheld on appeal. 
An unarticulated standard for determining competency to waive the 
right to counsel would best meet the concerns of accuracy and fairness 
that are present in civil-commitment proceedings. Providing trial courts 
the greatest amount of discretion possible would allow for determina-
tions of competency based on the particularities of each case, and would 
engender the development of a body of judicial opinions and customs 
focused on facts instead of rules. While an articulated standard would 
minimize the chances of reversible error, it would also create a greater 
chance that defendants will be wrongfully deprived of their right to 
waive counsel by limiting judicial discretion to make rulings based pri-
marily on the facts of the case at hand.61 Any benefits of consistency in 
                                                                                                                                     
would have already deemed such a record to be sufficient, then subsequent courts replicating that 
record would likely be affirmed on appeal. 
 59. See Marks, supra note 26, at 839. 
 60. See, e.g., State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 443 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (dis-
missing appeal because defendant had already completed his ninety-day civil commitment, leaving 
no available relief). 
 61. Some legal scholars have also raised concerns that the Supreme Court’s failure to articulate 
a competency standard will cause appellate courts to simply defer to the determinations of trial 
courts, even when there is significant evidence that the defendant suffered from a severe mental 
impairment. See generally John H. Blume & Morgan J. Clark, “Unwell”: Indiana v. Edwards and 
the Fate of Mentally Ill Pro Se Defendants, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 151 (2011) (reviewing 
facts of trial-court decisions to demonstrate that convictions were affirmed despite manifest mental 
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application gained by articulating a competency standard could also be 
gained by articulating a procedure for building the factual record on 
which a ruling will be based. By relying on an unarticulated competency 
standard and a clear procedural standard, courts can maximize their dis-
cretion while ensuring that a factual record sufficiently supports the rul-
ing. 
III. STANDARD OF COMPETENCY CURRENTLY REQUIRED UNDER 
WASHINGTON STATE LAW 
The right to counsel in civil-commitment proceedings within Wash-
ington State is a statutory creation.62 Section 71.05.360(5)(b) of the 
Washington Revised Code states: 
[A party subject to civil commitment] has a right to communicate 
immediately with an attorney; has a right to have an attorney ap-
pointed to represent him or her before and at the probable cause 
hearing if he or she is indigent; and has the right to be told the name 
and address of the attorney that the mental health professional has 
designated pursuant to this chapter. 
Additionally, the court in In re Detention of J.S. expressly held that “the 
right of self representation should apply in civil commitment proceed-
ings.”63 The formulation of these rights is substantively identical to the 
rights to counsel and self-representation afforded to defendants in state 
criminal proceedings.64 
The Washington State mental-illness statutory scheme states that 
“[n]o person shall be presumed incompetent as a consequence of receiv-
ing an evaluation or voluntary or involuntary treatment for a mental dis-
order . . . .”65 The state legislature has also expressly stated that it did not 
intend to create a presumption that a person found incompetent to stand 
trial “is gravely disabled or presents a likelihood of serious harm requir-
                                                                                                                                     
illnesses that impaired pro se defendants’ abilities to defend themselves). But this concern is less 
compelling in the civil-commitment context, where it is more important to ensure a just result at the 
trial-court level than it is to provide remedial tools on appeal. See supra Part II. 
 62. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360(5)(b) (2009). 
 63. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 440. 
 64. The Washington State Constitution provides that “[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. This 
clause has been interpreted as unequivocally guaranteeing the constitutional right to represent one-
self, though only in criminal proceedings. State v. Silva, 27 P.3d 663, 672 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 65. § 71.05.360(1)(b). 
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ing civil commitment.”66 This statutory bar on presumed incompetence 
has been interpreted as achieving a comparatively similar result to state 
laws that expressly recognize a presumption of competency.67 Implicit in 
the constructive presumption of competency is the need to make a de-
termination regarding the competency of a defendant seeking to waive 
counsel that is separate from the determination of whether that defendant 
meets the standard for involuntary commitment.68 
The trial court must make three distinct findings with regard to a 
defendant’s attempted waiver of counsel, regardless of whether the pro-
ceedings are criminal or civil in nature.69 As a preliminary matter, the 
court must find that the defendant unequivocally waived the right to 
counsel.70 The trial court must then follow a two-step process: “First, the 
trial court must determine if the person is competent to decide whether to 
waive his [or her] right to counsel. Second, if the trial court finds the per-
son competent, then it must determine whether the person is waiving 
counsel knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”71 
To determine competency to waive counsel in criminal proceed-
ings, Washington courts have traditionally applied a standard similar to 
the one created by Dusky and Faretta.72 The Washington State Supreme 
Court recently affirmed this approach in In re Rhome, holding that courts 
are only required to determine whether defendants are competent to stand 
                                                            
 66. Act of Feb. 14, 1998, ch. 297, § 1, 1998 Wash. Sess. Laws 1547, 1547 (amending Wash-
ington statutes regarding the commitment of mentally ill persons). The Washington State mental-
illness statutes were expressly intended to only: 
(1) clarify that it is the nature of a person’s current conduct, current mental condition, his-
tory, and likelihood of committing future acts that pose a threat to public safety or him-
self or herself, rather than simple categorization of offenses, that should determine treat-
ment procedures and level; (2) improve and clarify the sharing of information between 
the mental health and criminal justice systems; and (3) provide additional opportunities 
for mental health treatment for persons whose conduct threatens himself or herself or 
threatens public safety and has led to contact with the criminal justice system. 
Id. 
 67. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 442. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 437. 
 70. Id. at 440. 
 71. Id. at 442. 
 72. Compare State v. McDonald, 979 P.2d 857, 862–63 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (“To find a 
defendant competent, a court must determine whether the defendant (a) understands the nature of the 
proceedings against him; (b) is able to assist in his own defense; and (c) knowingly and intelligently 
decided to waive counsel.” (citing State v. Hahn, 726 P.2d 25, 30–31 (Wash. 1986))), with Dusky v. 
United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (requiring determination of “(1) whether the defendant has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him and (2) whether the defend-
ant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational un-
derstanding”), and Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (requiring waiver of counsel to be 
made “knowingly and intelligently”). 
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trial before allowing them to proceed pro se.73 Although the court con-
sidered only the constitutional right to self-representation in criminal 
proceedings, its holding is likely to apply with equal force to civil-
commitment proceedings due to the substantive similarity between the 
rights to self-representation in criminal and civil-commitment matters.74 
But there are two indications that the current standard for compe-
tency determinations in Washington is more akin to an unarticulated 
standard that exceeds Dusky. First, the Washington legislature has creat-
ed statutory factors that allow courts to consider evidence when deter-
mining competency that is beyond the scope of the Dusky standard.75 The 
broadest of these statutory factors looks to whether the defendant seeking 
to waive counsel “does so understanding . . . [a]ll other facts essential to 
a broad understanding of the whole matter.”76 This factor provides a sig-
nificant amount of discretion to the court with regard to the type of evi-
dence it chooses to consider because such an inquiry into a defendant’s 
understanding effectively allows courts to make competency determina-
tions based on any and all information available to them. A “broad un-
derstanding” is not necessary to satisfy the first prong of the Dusky 
standard, which requires only that the defendant have a rational and fac-
tual understanding of the proceeding.77 But evidence of a defendant’s 
broad understanding would include evidence of that defendant’s ability 
to conduct his or her own defense. Consideration of that ability was one 
of the primary reasons the Supreme Court held that states can apply a 
standard for competency that exceeds the Dusky standard.78 
Secondly, although In re Rhome affirmed the Dusky standard as the 
only test constitutionally required for the determination of a defendant’s 
competency to waive counsel, it regarded that test as the constitutional 
minimum.79 The Washington State Supreme Court recognized that trial 
                                                            
 73. The defendant in In re Rhome asked the court “to conclude as a matter of law that a judge 
must independently determine that a defendant is mentally competent not just to stand trial but to 
represent himself.” In re Rhome, 260 P.3d 874, 880 (Wash. 2011). The court rejected this request 
and held that no new level of competency for self-representation was required above and beyond the 
competency to stand trial. Id. at 881–82. 
 74. See supra notes 14, 64, and accompanying text. 
 75. See McDonald, 979 P.2d at 863 (stating courts “may also review” the statutory factors of 
section 10.77.020(1) of the Washington Revised Code when inquiring into the competency of a 
defendant to waive counsel). 
 76. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020 (2006). 
 77. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 170 (2008) (citing Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402). 
 78. As previously stated, the Supreme Court was concerned that under the Dusky standard, 
some defendants will be found competent to waive counsel while they are, in practice, unable to 
adequately present their cases due to mental illness. Id. at 176–77. 
 79. In re Rhome, 260 P.3d 874, 881 (Wash. 2011) (noting that while the Dusky standard is the 
current standard for competency, Edwards allows for a more stringent waiver-of-counsel standard). 
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courts may “limit the right to self-representation when there is a question 
about a defendant’s competency . . . even if the defendant has been found 
competent to stand trial.”80 Courts can apply this heightened standard 
because of their duty to consider the impact that waivers of counsel will 
have on defendants’ countervailing rights, such as the right to a fair trial 
and due process.81 “[T]rial courts may consider that a defendant’s mental 
capacity will have serious and negative effects on the ability to conduct a 
defense.”82 Thus, the Washington State Supreme Court has determined 
that mental capacity is a factor in the determination of a defendant’s 
competency to waive counsel.83 
Both the Washington State Supreme Court and the Washington leg-
islature allow courts to consider evidence that is probative of defendants’ 
ability to conduct their defense,84 and the combination of these allowanc-
es has implicitly created an unarticulated standard for competency that is 
beyond the requirements of Dusky. Indeed, although the supreme court 
declined to require the consideration of a defendant’s mental health dur-
ing competency determinations, it recognized that the current law already 
allows courts to do so and thus declined to articulate an express, formu-
lated rule.85 In so holding, the court essentially recognized that Washing-
ton applies an unarticulated competency standard that grants courts the 
discretion to make determinations based on consideration beyond the 
scope of Dusky.86 
The determination of competency to waive the right to counsel does 
not depend on the waiver being made knowingly, voluntarily, or intelli-
gently. Under Washington’s determination process, a court addresses 
                                                            
 80. Id. at 879. 
 81. Id. at 880, 883 (“‘[I]f the court determines that [the defendant] does not have the requisite 
mental competency to intelligently waive the services of counsel nor adequate mental competency to 
act as his own counsel, then his [fair trial and due process rights are] disregarded if the court permits 
him to so act in a criminal case.’” (quoting State v. Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d 774, 779–80 (Wash. 
1968))). 
 82. Id. at 883. The court noted that “nothing precludes trial courts from inquiring further into a 
defendant’s ability to waive counsel when mental health concerns are present.” Id. 
 83. The court actually stated “that a defendant’s mental health status is but one factor a trial 
court may consider in determining whether a defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his 
right to counsel.” Id. at 881. But the court’s prior statement that a party can be deemed incompetent 
despite satisfying the Dusky standard, id. at 880, when viewed in conjunction with the statutory 
factors for competency that are considered in addition to the Dusky standard, State v. McDonald, 979 
P.2d 857, 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999), renders it likely that the court meant for this factor to be ap-
plied during competency analyses. 
 84. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020 (2006); In re Rhome, 260 P.3d at 883. 
 85. In re Rhome, 260 P.3d at 881 (“The existing law already provides for judges to be sensitive 
to mental health issues when considering whether to grant a waiver.”). 
 86. See id. at 883 (recognizing that courts have discretion to “consider [whether] a defendant’s 
mental capacity will have serious and negative effects on the ability to conduct a defense”). 
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whether a defendant’s waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intel-
ligently only after it first determines a defendant’s competency.87 Thus, 
Washington’s articulation of a two-step process seemingly rejects a 
standard for determining competency that depends on whether a defend-
ant was, at that time, capable of knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
waiving counsel. The two-step process also treats competency as a mere 
prerequisite for knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver. Since a court 
must consider the second step only if a defendant is found to be compe-
tent, it is implied that a finding of competency is not dispositive of the 
issue of whether a waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently. 
IV. ONE- OR TWO-STEP PROCESS FOR THE DETERMINATION OF 
COMPETENCY DURING CIVIL-COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
While In re Detention of J.S. recognized a distinct two-step process 
for competency determinations in civil-commitment proceedings, such a 
division of the determination is not easy to apply, nor has it historically 
been applied consistently. The Washington State Supreme Court has pre-
viously stated: 
[I]f the court determines that [a defendant] does not have the 
requisite mental competency to intelligently waive the services 
of counsel nor adequate mental competency to act as his own 
counsel, then his right to a fair trial and his constitutional right to 
due process of law, is disregarded if the court permits him to so 
act in a criminal case.88 
This statement, which other Washington courts have relied upon,89 
demonstrates a natural tendency to blur the determinations of whether a 
                                                            
 87. See State v. Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d 774, 779–80 (Wash. 1968), which stated the following: 
[I]f the court determines that [the defendant] does not have the requisite mental compe-
tency to intelligently waive the services of counsel nor adequate mental competency to 
act as his own counsel, then his right to a fair trial and his constitutional right to due pro-
cess of law, is disregarded if the court permits him to so act in a criminal case. 
This passage demonstrates that an intelligent waiver can occur only when the party is first found to 
be competent. See In re Rhome, 260 P.3d at 881 (noting that prior case law found knowing and intel-
ligent waiver subsequent to a competency determination). While the court in In re Rhome stated that 
“an independent determination of competency for self-representation is [not] constitutional[ly] man-
date[d],” the passage refers only to the court’s refusal to impose a level of competency that exceeds 
what is required under the Dusky standard. Id. 
 88. Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d at 779–80. 
 89. See, e.g., In re Rhome, 260 P.3d at 879; In re Meade, 693 P.2d 713, 717 (Wash. 1985); 
State v. Imus, 679 P.2d 376, 388 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984). 
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party is competent to waive counsel and whether the waiver is made 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.90 
Other state courts also frequently blur the requirement that a de-
fendant be competent to waive counsel with the requirement that a de-
fendant’s waiver be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.91 
This tendency seems to arise from the inherent interrelatedness of a de-
fendant’s competency and ability to act knowingly, voluntarily, and in-
telligently. This interrelatedness can potentially frustrate courts’ attempts 
to consider a defendant’s competency to make decisions about legal 
rights without simultaneously considering whether that defendant knows 
the nature and effect of those decisions, understands the gravity of the 
situation, and acts willfully without basing such decisions on illogical 
thinking or compulsions caused by mental illness. Even courts that clear-
ly divide competency determinations into two distinct analyses struggle 
with this interconnectedness.92 As one court noted, “[I]t appears inherent-
ly contradictory to find a respondent severely mentally ill, yet able to 
knowingly and intelligently ‘waive’ his right to counsel.”93 
Despite the inherent difficulty with segmented application, many 
states apply Washington’s two-step procedure.94 The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court requires that in civil cases trial courts conduct two inquiries to de-
termine whether a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel is valid.95 
The first inquiry is whether the waiver is “knowing, intelligent and vol-
untary,” and the second is whether the defendant is competent to proceed 
pro se.96 Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court has also articulated 
the following requirements: 
Our trial courts must recognize a distinction between what are two 
separate and independent determinations in mental health proceed-
                                                            
 90. In the above passage, the court conflated the requirement of competency with the separate 
requirement of intelligent waiver by calling for the determination of a defendant’s “competency to 
intelligently waive” counsel. See Kolocotronis, 436 P.2d at 779. 
 91. See, e.g., In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 688–90 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (setting forth two 
separate steps for competency determination and then merging their consideration); State v. Ar-
guelles, 63 P.3d 731, 751 (Utah 2003) (treating knowing and voluntary waiver as requirements of 
competency). 
 92. See, e.g., T.Z. v. R.Z. (In re Interest of R.Z.), 415 N.W.2d 486, 488 (N.D. 1987). 
 93. Id. (noting the awkwardness of applying to mental-health proceedings principles of compe-
tency originally developed for criminal proceedings). 
 94. Indeed, Washington’s two-step approach is itself based on the standards first applied by 
other states. State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 441–42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (analyzing 
determination of competency to waive counsel under Illinois, North Dakota, and Wisconsin state 
law). 
 95. S.Y. v. Eau Claire Cnty. (In re S.Y.), 457 N.W.2d 326, 328 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 96. Id. 
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ings. First, the trial court determines competence for the limited 
purpose of assessing the [party]’s ability to knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive counsel. This determination must occur at the 
beginning of the proceeding . . . . Assuming nothing overcomes the 
presumption that respondent is competent, the trial court proceeds 
to determine if the respondent’s waiver of counsel is knowing, intel-
ligent, and voluntary.97 
But even these examples of nearly identical two-step processes demon-
strate confusion over which requirement is to be addressed first: the 
competency of the party or the validity of the waiver. While a party must 
be competent in order to effect a valid waiver of the right to counsel, an 
inquiry into one will necessarily overlap with an inquiry into the other 
due to the interrelatedness of the two concepts. 
Although the two-step process to determine competency to waive 
the right to counsel seems to be conceptually warranted, use of a seg-
mented, two-step inquiry is both impractical and counter-intuitive. A 
person does not act knowingly if incapable of understanding what is oc-
curring. A person does not necessarily act voluntarily when under the 
influence of a psychological compulsion. And a person does not act intel-
ligently if his or her sincerely held beliefs are irrational or the result of 
delusion. All of these issues pertain directly to competency, and an in-
quiry into one will necessarily entail inquiry into the other. Courts should 
thus view the inquiry into a proposed waiver of counsel as a single step, 
where the colloquy conducted and extrinsic evidence considered will 
provide the information required to make two separate determinations 
regarding a party’s competency to waive the right to counsel and the va-
lidity of such a waiver. 
V. INQUIRY INTO COMPETENCY AND VALIDITY 
In order for a trial court to enter findings regarding a defendant’s 
competency to waive the right to counsel and the validity of such a waiv-
er, there is a clear requirement that the record support the court’s deci-
sion.98 Even when a trial court has neglected to inquire into the defend-
                                                            
 97. Miller v. C.S. (In re Interest of C.S.), 713 N.W.2d 542, 547 (N.D. 2006). The inquiries are 
substantively similar to those required in Wisconsin, though they are addressed in a reverse order. 
Compare id., with In re S.Y., 457 N.W.2d at 328. 
 98. See, e.g., In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 688 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[A] person with a men-
tal health diagnosis can waive his right to counsel so long as he is competent to make the decision 
and the record supports the trial court’s decision.”); Interest of R.Z., 415 N.W.2d at 488 (“[A] re-
spondent in a mental health proceeding may waive counsel and assert the right to self-representation, 
only if the waiver is knowing and intelligent and voluntary and only if it appears on the record. Ab-
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ant’s competency to waive counsel, appellate courts can uphold the deni-
al of that right based on the “totality of the record” supporting such a 
denial. 99 Thus, it is important to ensure that the evidentiary record con-
tains information an appellate court can “hang its hat on,” if need be. By 
creating a strong evidentiary record prior to determining the defendant’s 
competency and the validity of the waiver, the trial court can help mini-
mize the chance that the denial of the waiver of counsel will lead to a 
reversal on appeal. A strong evidentiary record also protects the defend-
ant’s rights by helping ensure that the court’s determination is based on a 
sufficient amount of facts,100 rather than on presumptions made about a 
defendant who faces civil commitment or who was previously found in-
competent to stand trial. Additionally, the more voluminous the eviden-
tiary record, the more fair the proceedings will be viewed by third-
parties, which is a concern the Supreme Court has deemed important in 
the realm of involuntary commitment.101 
Trial courts have a great deal of discretion when conducting inquir-
ies into the competency of the parties that appear before them. Such de-
terminations of a person’s competency to waive the right to counsel 
“must rest to a large extent upon the judgment and experience of the trial 
judge.”102 But trial courts are to approach issues of waiver of counsel 
with a strong presumption against finding that a waiver has validly oc-
curred.103 Given the strong presumption against waiver articulated by the 
Washington State Supreme Court, trial courts should take great steps to 
ensure that evidentiary records heavily support their determinations re-
garding competency and validity of waiver, regardless of the level of 
discretion afforded them. 
Trial courts could best assure an evidentiary record sufficient to 
support their determinations by articulating a comprehensive, step-by-
step process for building that record. If a trial court designs its fact-
finding process to ensure a well-developed evidentiary record, there will 
be a greater chance that appellate courts will find the record to be suffi-
                                                                                                                                     
sent evidence of a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of counsel, a respondent in an involun-
tary commitment proceeding may not represent himself.”). 
 99. See In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 690 (two petitions and two affidavits regarding appellant’s 
mental health were sufficient to support a denial of his request to waive counsel, despite a lack of 
findings on the matter by the trial court). 
 100. See Marks, supra note 26, at 841. 
 101. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (“[P]roceedings must not only be fair, 
they must appear fair to all who observe them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 102. State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Wis. 1997). 
 103. “[Trial] ‘courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against finding that a de-
fendant has waived the right to counsel.’” State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 440 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Vermillion, 51 P.3d 188, 192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)). 
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cient. Trial courts consistently following a uniform process will also 
minimize variations in the records on which their findings are based. If 
trial courts followed a fact-finding process detailed by the legislature or 
the state supreme court, then they could maximize the likelihood that the 
records they generate are sufficient.104 Since the Washington State Su-
preme Court and legislature have yet to address this issue, this Part pro-
poses a process that trial courts should use when determining a defend-
ant’s competency to waive counsel in a civil-commitment proceeding. 
That procedure should consist of a detailed and standardized colloquy 
between the judge and the defendant, as well as a limited consideration 
of extrinsic evidence. 
A. Colloquy with the Party Seeking to Waive the Right to Counsel 
Washington law does not currently require a colloquy to be per-
formed when a defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel.105 In In re 
Detention of J.S., Division II of the Washington Court of Appeals de-
clined to consider whether a colloquy was required to determine the 
competency of a party to waive the right to counsel or the validity of 
such a waiver.106 But several courts,107 including the Washington State 
Supreme Court,108 have recognized that a colloquy between the judge 
and the defendant is the most efficient way to build an evidentiary record 
on which to base a competency determination. 
While some states have been hesitant to mandate that trial courts 
conduct a colloquy prior to ruling on a party’s competency,109 others 
have expressly created such a requirement. In Wisconsin, whenever a 
defendant seeks to waive the right to counsel, a trial court is required to 
engage in a colloquy to determine whether the waiver is valid.110 Similar-
                                                            
 104. See supra note 58. 
 105. See City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (Wash. 1984) (declining to require 
courts to perform a colloquy when a defendant requests to waive counsel). 
 106. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 443 n.12. 
 107. See, e.g., Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721 (“Conducting such an examination of the defendant 
is the clearest and most efficient means of insuring that the defendant has validly waived his right to 
the assistance of counsel, and of preserving and documenting that valid waiver for purposes of ap-
peal and postconviction motions.”). 
 108. See Acrey, 691 P.2d at 962 (“[A] colloquy on the record is the preferred means of assuring 
that defendants understand the risks of self-representation. We strongly recommend such a colloquy 
as the most efficient means of limiting appeals.”). 
 109. This hesitancy may result from the fact that determinations of competency are subject to 
the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review. See In re Rhome, 260 P.3d 874, 881 (Wash. 
2011). Given that appellate courts attempt to rule narrowly, such a deferential analysis likely dis-
courages them from setting forth new standards of conduct to govern the actions of future trial 
courts. 
 110. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721. 
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ly, the North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that “in a mental health 
proceeding where the respondent wishes to represent himself, the trial 
court [is expected to] engage in a colloquy with the respondent before 
allowing respondent to proceed pro se.”111 
The use of colloquies is an effective way to build a sufficient evi-
dentiary record on which courts may base their determinations of compe-
tency. A colloquy between the judge and a would-be pro se defendant 
serves three important functions: (1) the colloquy answers provide sub-
stantive information on which the judge can base a ruling; (2) the collo-
quy allows the judge to ensure for the record that the defendant is in-
formed of his or her rights, as well as the benefits being waived;112 and 
(3) the colloquy gives the judge an opportunity to gauge how the defend-
ant might behave during the proceedings, should the waiver be granted. 
No other type of procedure can provide so much information regarding a 
defendant’s abilities or understanding.113 Colloquies also have the benefit 
of malleability, as the questions can be altered or supplemented based on 
the peculiarities of the circumstances. 
An express list of colloquy questions would provide substantial di-
rection to trial courts while serving numerous public interests. Use of a 
predetermined series of questions would help ensure the uniformity of 
evidentiary records, as all courts would seek to uncover roughly the same 
information. Court proceedings would also be rendered more efficient 
because the judge would already have a series of topics and questions to 
utilize.114 Additionally, use of an express list of questions would allow 
courts to further fine-tune the fact-finding process by drawing the atten-
tion of litigators and legal scholars to the conventions for colloquies, 
which would increase the subject’s treatment in legal arguments, legal 
scholarship, and court orders.115 Improving the uniformity, efficiency, 
                                                            
 111. Miller v. C.S. (In re Interest of C.S.), 713 N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D. 2006). 
 112. See State v. Chavis, 644 P.2d 1202, 1205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that the require-
ments of Faretta can be addressed during a colloquy). 
 113. See id. (noting that a judge “must make a penetrating and comprehensive examination in 
order to properly assess” a party’s waiver of counsel). No other procedure is as malleable or quickly 
adaptable as a colloquy, which allows judges to address the specific questions they may have that are 
particular to a specific case, arise during a hearing or trial, and are not addressed by documents filed 
by the parties. 
 114. Federal courts already use a similar shortcut for the determination of competency to waive 
counsel in criminal proceedings. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BENCHBOOK FOR U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
JUDGES 6–7 (5th ed. 2007) [hereinafter BENCHBOOK], available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf. 
nsf/lookup/Benchbk5.pdf/$file/Benchbk5.pdf. 
 115. In In re Detention of J.S., the court declined to review the sufficiency of the colloquy 
between the judge and the defendant because the issue was not litigated at the trial-court level. State 
v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 443 n.12 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
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litigation, and responsiveness of the fact-finding process would increase 
the transparency of competency determinations, which would also in-
crease the public’s perception that the proceedings were fair.116 
Courts should create an express list of colloquy questions to realize 
the numerous benefits of such established procedures for building the 
evidentiary record. Despite those benefits, most courts have resisted the 
creation of or declined to create an express list of questions for trial 
courts to ask during colloquies.117 But since the Supreme Court now 
permits state courts to formulate requirements for competency that are 
stricter than the Dusky requirements,118 courts are free to seek and con-
sider information that does not simply pertain to a defendant’s factual 
understanding of the proceedings or ability to consult with an attorney. 
Thus, courts can seek information regarding any issues that they feel may 
pertain to the competency of defendants. 
This section proposes a comprehensive series of topics that trial 
courts both in and outside of Washington State can use to frame their 
fact-finding processes during civil-commitment proceedings. The series 
is based on considerations of colloquy standards employed in different 
proceedings and by different jurisdictions, as well as statutory considera-
tions that are unique to Washington. 
1. Applicability of Colloquy Requirements Used in Criminal Proceedings 
Courts frequently look to the standards used in criminal proceed-
ings for guidance in determining a civil defendant’s competency. The 
procedures adhered to in a mental-health proceeding, including the pro-
cedures that govern a defendant’s right to counsel, “generally are compa-
rable and similar to [tests] followed in criminal cases.”119 Division II of 
the Washington Court of Appeals has similarly looked to the state crimi-
nal statute120 regarding the determination of competency for guidance in 
making such a determination in civil matters.121 But the court explicitly 
                                                            
 116. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (“[P]roceedings must not only be fair, 
they must appear fair to all who observe them.” (citations omitted)). 
 117. Compare Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 443 n.12 and State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 721 
(Wis. 1997), with In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). Again, this may be a 
product of the highly deferential standard of review that is applied to issues of competency determi-
nation. See supra note 109. 
 118. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178. 
 119. Schmidt v. Ebertz (In re Interest of Ebertz), 333 N.W.2d 786, 788 (N.D. 1983); see also 
In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 687 (“Although a civil commitment proceeding cannot ‘be equated to a 
criminal prosecution,’ the standards in criminal cases have been examined to determine when waiver 
can occur.” (citations omitted)). 
 120. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(1) (2006). 
 121. Det. of J.S., 159 P.3d at 442. 
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declined to address whether the statute should control the colloquy used 
to determine whether a defendant’s waiver of counsel is valid.122 
Washington’s statutory requirements addressing the determination 
of competency to waive counsel in criminal cases seem a likely source of 
considerations to be included in colloquies made in the civil-commitment 
context. The Washington statute identifies five statutory factors123 that 
require courts to consider whether criminal defendants understand “(a) 
[t]he nature of the charges; (b) [t]he statutory offense included within 
them; (c) [t]he range of allowable punishments thereunder; (d) [p]ossible 
defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof; and (e) 
[a]ll other facts essential to a broad understanding of the whole mat-
ter.”124 
Unfortunately, the factors in the Washington statute are largely in-
applicable to civil-commitment cases and are thus uninformative for any 
colloquy conducted. First, defendants do not need to be informed of any 
charges because they face no charges in civil-commitment proceedings. 
The government instead seeks to commit defendants based on the con-
cerns of health professionals, family, or friends that the defendant may 
pose a danger to others or to himself or herself.125 
Second, the absence of charges made against the defendant also 
means that there are no statutory offenses for the defendant to under-
stand, which renders discussion of statutory offenses and allowable pun-
ishments unnecessary. The only “negative” consequence of involuntary 
commitment is the commitment itself, which entails a loss of freedom 
and subjection to involuntary treatment,126 as well as a temporary cur-
tailment of the defendant’s right to possess firearms.127 Since the com-
mitment sought must be for an express and finite amount of time,128 in-
forming the defendant of that timeframe would have some value in estab-
lishing a record of the defendant’s knowledge. But if defendants do not 
understand the ultimate consequences of involuntary commitment, then 
they would be less likely to contest the proceedings because they would 
                                                            
 122. Id. at 443 n.12. 
 123. § 10.77.020(1). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.153 (2011). 
 126. See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.215 (2008) (allowing for the possibility of involuntary 
medication). 
 127. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.41.040(2)(a)(ii) (2011); 71.05.360(1)(a) (2009). 
 128. Involuntary detentions can be for an initial three-day evaluation period or for 14, 90, or 
180 days. See §§ 71.05.150, 71.05.230, 71.05.290. 
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not understand, or necessarily be concerned with, the possibility of a 
temporary loss of their freedom or ability to forego treatment.129 
The final two statutory factors, that defendants understand both the 
possible defenses available to them and “other facts essential to a broad 
understanding of the whole matter,” are relevant to determinations of 
competency in civil-commitment cases but do not provide much mean-
ingful direction. A defendant’s understanding of available defenses with 
regard to involuntary commitment bears directly on whether that defend-
ant is competent to waive the right to counsel because such knowledge 
(or lack thereof) would presumably affect his or her decision to proceed 
pro se.130 The Supreme Court has deemed technical legal knowledge ir-
relevant to the determination of whether a party has knowingly waived 
the right to counsel.131 But courts frequently seek information regarding a 
party’s legal experience when determining whether a waiver is valid.132 
The Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges (Benchbook)133 also sug-
gests including questions regarding a defendant’s legal experience and 
education when conducting a colloquy with the defendant.134 Given the 
frequency with which competency determinations are at least in part 
based on questions regarding the legal experience of a party, it is likely 
that such questions will be expected to be included in any colloquy in a 
civil-commitment proceeding. 
The final statutory factor provides the court with wide discretion to 
consider evidence regarding whether a defendant understands facts “es-
sential to a broad understanding of the whole matter.”135 But the statutory 
language provides no meaningful direction with regard to what evidence 
would or should be deemed “essential.” This provision could be viewed 
as simply providing judges with express discretion to consider extrinsic 
evidence they deem relevant to their determinations of competency.136 
Yet, the factor does not provide any line of questioning for use by civil 
courts in conducting a colloquy with a party seeking to waive the right to 
counsel. 
                                                            
 129. See Marks, supra note 26, at 848 (noting that mental illness may operate to “remove the 
defendant’s will to defend”). 
 130. See id. at 849 (noting mental illness may affect a defendant’s formation of defenses). 
 131. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975). 
 132. See, e.g., In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); State v. J.S. (In re Det. 
of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 438 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007). 
 133. The Benchbook is created by a panel of experienced federal district court judges appointed 
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and is intended to serve as a practice guide for use in 
educating incoming or current trial-court judges. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at ii. 
 134. Id. at 6–7. 
 135. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(1)(e) (2006). 
 136. See infra Part V.B. 
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Questions of applicability also arise when considering the require-
ments for colloquies employed in other states between judges and crimi-
nal defendants. Common requirements in other states include that de-
fendants be made aware of the seriousness of the charges made against 
them, as well as the general range of punishments they may be subject 
to.137 These requirements provide no more help than the Washington 
State statutory requirements in demonstrating either the competency of a 
party to waive counsel or the validity of such a waiver. Discussion of the 
seriousness of the charges is functionally equivalent to, and no more ap-
plicable than, an understanding of “the nature of the charges,”138 and dis-
cussion of the range of punishments available is nearly identical to the 
Washington statutory language.139 These inquiries do not have any rele-
vance in civil-commitment proceedings and would not help demonstrate 
whether a party is competent to waive counsel or whether a party’s waiv-
er is valid. 
Consideration of the questions enumerated in the Benchbook also 
raises similar issues of inapplicability to the civil context. The 
Benchbook lists fourteen questions or statements to direct toward a crim-
inal defendant when determining the validity of a waiver for the purpose 
of “mak[ing] clear on the record that [the] defendant is fully aware of the 
hazards and disadvantages of self-representation.”140 The questions re-
                                                            
 137. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Mass. 1999) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 383 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Mass. 1978)); State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 
721 (Wis. 1997); see also State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046, 1062 (Wash. 2001). 
 138. Compare Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721 (requiring discussion of seriousness of the charges 
against defendant), with § 10.77.020(1) (requiring discussion of the nature of the charges against 
defendant). 
 139. Compare Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721 (requiring a defendant be made aware of “the gen-
eral range of penalties that could have been imposed on him”), with § 10.77.020(1)(c) (requiring a 
defendant be informed of “the range of allowable punishments” available under the statutory offense 
at issue). 
140. If the defendant states that he or she wishes to represent himself or herself, you 
should ask questions similar to the following: 
1. Have you ever studied law? 
2. Have you ever represented yourself in a criminal action? 
3. Do you understand that you are charged with these crimes: [state the crimes with 
which the defendant is charged]? 
4. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of the crime charged in Count I, the 
court must impose an assessment of $100 and could sentence you to as many as ___ years 
in prison, impose a term of supervised release that follows imprisonment, fine you as 
much as $____, and direct you to pay restitution? [Ask the defendant a similar question 
for each crime charged in the indictment or information.]. 
5. Do you understand that if you are found guilty of more than one of these crimes, 
this court can order that the sentences be served consecutively, that is, one after another? 
6. Do you understand that there are advisory Sentencing Guidelines that may have an 
effect on your sentence if you are found guilty? 
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garding a party’s legal experience and education are detailed141 but are 
also likely unnecessary in light of the Faretta decision, which cast doubt 
on the value of such questions.142 But even Faretta placed some im-
portance on the education of a party seeking to waive counsel, as the 
Court found it significant that the defendant was literate.143 While the 
Court expressly stated that a defendant “need not himself have the skill 
and experience of a lawyer” to be competent to waive counsel,144 this 
language seemingly allows courts to consider the presence of legal skill 
and experience as a relevant factor for the determination of competen-
cy.145 
The Benchbook questions do raise two meaningful issues that a 
judge should address in a colloquy when a civil party seeks to waive 
counsel. The first is an express question regarding whether the waiver is 
being made voluntarily.146 This question is similar to the requirement in 
Wisconsin that colloquies ensure a party seeking to waive counsel “made 
                                                                                                                                     
7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell 
you or even advise you how you should try your case. 
8. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Evidence? 
9. Do you understand that the rules of evidence govern what evidence may or may not 
be introduced at trial, that in representing yourself, you must abide by those very tech-
nical rules, and that they will not be relaxed for your benefit? 
10. Are you familiar with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure? 
11. Do you understand that those rules govern the way a criminal action is tried in fed-
eral court, that you are bound by those rules, and that they will not be relaxed for your 
benefit? 
[Then say to the defendant something to this effect:] 
12. I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer would defend you far better 
than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. 
You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not 
familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
13. Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found guilty, and in 
light of all of the difficulties of representing yourself, do you still desire to represent 
yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a lawyer? 
14. Is your decision entirely voluntary? 
BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 4–5; see also State v. Christensen, 698 P.2d 1069, 1073 n.2 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the questions outlined in the Benchbook). 
 141. Inquiries about the party’s legal experience and education account for seven of the four-
teen total suggested questions. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 4–5. 
 142. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833 n.43 (1975) (“‘Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.’” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))). 
 143. Id. at 835. 
 144. Id. 
 145. The Court’s formulation expressly bars the requirement of such skill and experience, but 
it is silent as to the ability of courts to consider a particular defendant’s skill and experience. Id. 
 146. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 7. 
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a deliberate choice to proceed without counsel.”147 The answer does not 
prove that a party’s waiver is actually voluntary, especially when the 
case involves mental illness. But it does help to establish an evidentiary 
record to that effect by providing some evidence of voluntariness.148 
The second issue raised by the Benchbook is the series of questions 
and statements designed to ensure that the defendant is cognizant of the 
benefits waived by the refusal of counsel. In particular, question twelve 
addresses the party’s lack of familiarity with evidentiary rules and court 
procedures, as well as the party’s inability to self-represent relative to a 
trained attorney.149 Questioning that highlights the benefits lost as a re-
sult of waiving counsel is essentially the same as informing the defend-
ant of the dangers of self-representation.150 
There is a nearly unanimous requirement that a party be made 
aware of the perils associated with self-representation prior to a trial 
court finding the party has validly waived the right to counsel. The Su-
preme Court has expressed that a party “should be made aware of the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will 
establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with 
eyes open.’”151 Moreover, state courts also consistently require that col-
loquies between trial judges and defendants must ensure that parties are 
informed of the dangers and disadvantages of waiving their right to 
counsel.152 Given the frequency with which such questioning is required, 
as well as the importance that the Supreme Court has attributed to in-
forming a defendant of the perils of waiving counsel, it is likely that a 
series of questions detailing the perils that a pro se defendant will face is 
required. 
                                                            
 147. State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 721 (Wis. 1997). 
 148. See id. at 719, 721 (requiring that a colloquy be used to ascertain on the record whether a 
defendant’s waiver of counsel is made voluntarily). 
 149. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 7. 
 150. In addition to lacking legal expertise, defendants may act in a manner in front of a judge 
that undermines their case. See generally Blume & Clark, supra note 61 (discussing trial-court pro-
ceedings in which mentally ill defendants openly acted in a bizarre or disturbing manner). 
 151. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. 
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). 
 152. See, e.g., Miller v. C.S. (In re Interest of C.S.), 713 N.W.2d 542, 548 (N.D. 2006) (stating 
that a “colloquy must ensure that the respondent is advised of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation”); Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721 (stating that a colloquy must ensure the defendant “was 
aware of the difficulties and disadvantages of self-representation”). 
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2. Additional Colloquy Requirements Used by Other States 
in Civil Proceedings 
Many jurisdictions have created additional standards for colloquies 
in the civil context, designating specific topics that must be addressed 
during a judge’s discussion with a defendant who wishes to waive the 
right to counsel.153 Most notably, Arizona has created an express list of 
five topics that trial court judges should address with a party seeking to 
waive the right to counsel in an involuntary-commitment hearing.154 Di-
vision I of the Arizona Court of Appeals formulated the list based on a 
detailed review of cases from other jurisdictions.155 Under Arizona law, 
when a party seeks to waive the right to counsel, the trial court should 
first inform the party of the right to counsel, and then advise the party of 
the consequences of waiving counsel.156 When discussing the conse-
quences, the trial court should specifically state that the party will be re-
sponsible for all aspects of presenting his or her case, which includes 
conducting cross-examinations, calling witnesses, presenting evidence, 
and making closing arguments.157 Similar to the Benchbook’s suggested 
colloquy,158 these lines of questioning first inform the party of the right 
and then emphasize the importance and possible impact of the decision 
to waive counsel.159 Expressly informing a party of the specific aspects 
of self-representation impresses upon the person the complexity of a pro 
se defense thus strengthening the record that the waiver is made know-
ingly and intelligently. 
Under the Arizona standard, the trial court is supposed to then 
“seek to discover why the [party] wants to represent himself [or herself], 
which may involve a dialogue with counsel or others.”160 This question 
serves as a novel approach to gathering evidence related to the validity of 
a party’s waiver, as learning the thought process behind the party’s deci-
sion will help demonstrate that a waiver is made knowingly and intelli-
gently by revealing whether the waiver is based on sound reasoning or 
                                                            
 153. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Simpson, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Mass. 1999) (citing 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 383 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Mass. 1978)); Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 721. 
 154. In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). These colloquy requirements 
were recently noted with approval by the North Carolina Court of Appeals. In re Watson, 706 S.E.2d 
296, 305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 155. In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 687–89. 
 156. Id. at 689. 
 157. Id. 
 158. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 6–7. 
 159. In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 689. 
 160. Id. 
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correct information.161 The question also directly addresses the party’s 
competency by requiring an articulation of the party’s motivations, 
which may demonstrate an irrational thought process or basis indicative 
of the presence of mental illness.162 
The final two topics under the Arizona standard are the defendant’s 
education, skill level, and training, as well as the defendant’s level of 
understanding of the legal proceedings and procedures.163 Both of these 
lines of inquiry have been previously considered with regard to current 
recommended inquiries in criminal cases. But the Arizona standard dif-
fers because it expressly links these questions to specific aspects of the 
determination of the competency of a defendant seeking to waive counsel 
and the validity of the waiver. Inquiries regarding the defendant’s educa-
tion, skill level, and training are deemed to pertain to the defendant’s 
competency to waive the right, while the defendant’s understanding of 
legal proceedings and procedure expressly pertain to the defendant’s un-
derstanding of the waived right.164 Should a court or legislature deem that 
these express indications of intentional focus are desirable to include, the 
added intent would provide valuable guidelines for courts to use when 
tailoring their questioning to seek specific information in the diverse fac-
tual circumstances they encounter. 
3. Availability of Standby or Advisory Counsel 
In order to better ensure that a pro se party’s rights are upheld, 
courts will sometimes appoint standby or advisory counsel to sit with the 
party during hearings.165 Standby counsel are able to field legal questions 
                                                            
 161. Though this approach is novel because the question was expressly required, Washington 
has previously articulated that its trial courts should also seek this information. See State v. Chavis, 
644 P.2d 1202, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]rial courts should attempt to determine the subjec-
tive reasons for the defendant’s refusal [of counsel].”). 
 162. See generally Blume & Clark, supra note 61 (discussing trial-court proceedings in which 
mentally ill defendants openly acted in a bizarre or disturbing manner). 
 163. In determining the competency of a defendant to waive counsel and the validity of that 
waiver, a court should “learn whether the patient has any education, skill or training that may be 
important to deciding whether he has the competence to make the decision . . . [and] determine 
whether the patient has some rudimentary understanding of the proceedings and procedures to show 
he understands the right he is waiving . . . .” In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 689. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court has stated that trial courts should use the express, though more narrow, factors of “the 
defendant’s education, literacy, [and] fluency in English” to determine a party’s competency to 
waive counsel in civil contexts. State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Wis. 1997) (citing Pickens v. 
State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980)). 
 164. In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 689. 
 165. See State v. Watkins, 857 P.2d 300, 305–06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding appoint-
ment of standby counsel where the trial court deemed such an appointment necessary and appropri-
ate). 
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from the party during the case, and they are also able to step in immedi-
ately if the party later decides against self-representation.166 While there 
is no federal constitutional right to standby counsel,167 trial courts have 
discretion to appoint standby counsel without the consent of the defend-
ant.168 As part of the colloquy, some courts require that judges disclose 
the availability of advisory counsel to a party seeking to waive coun-
sel.169 Additionally, the Benchbook states that “[i]t is probably advisable 
to appoint standby counsel, who can assist the defendant or can replace 
the defendant if the court determines during trial that the defendant can 
no longer be permitted to proceed pro se.”170 Because judges are encour-
aged to appoint advisory counsel where available, a court should at least 
disclose to a party prior to a waiver of counsel that such services are 
available. 
B. Extrinsic Evidence Regarding the Mental State of a Defendant 
Seeking to Waive the Right to Counsel 
The current Washington statute governing criminal competency de-
terminations, which has been considered in the civil-commitment con-
text,171 appears to allow courts to consider extrinsic evidence when de-
termining a defendant’s competency to waive counsel. The statute enu-
merates several factors for the court to consider, one of which is the de-
fendant’s understanding of “[a]ll other facts essential to a broad under-
standing of the whole matter.”172 This factor provides judges with broad 
discretion to consider evidence they deem relevant to the determinations 
at issue, which would seemingly allow for extrinsic evidence to be of-
fered to demonstrate a party’s competency or incompetency to waive 
counsel.173 Other state courts have articulated similar standards that seem 
to implicitly provide for the consideration of any evidence a judge deems 
                                                            
 166. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975) (finding that standby counsel may 
“aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused 
in the event that termination of the defendant’s self-representation is necessary”). 
 167. State v. Silva, 27 P.3d 663, 676 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 
 168. Watkins, 857 P.2d at 305. 
 169. Commonwealth v. Simpson, 704 N.E.2d 1131, 1135 n.5 (Mass. 1999) (citing Common-
wealth v. Jackson, 383 N.E.2d 835, 839 (Mass. 1978)). 
 170. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 6–8; see also State v. Christensen, 689 P.2d 1069, 1073 
n.2 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
 171. State v. J.S. (In re Det. of J.S.), 159 P.3d 435, 442–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007); see also In 
re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 687 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although a civil commitment proceeding 
cannot ‘be equated to a criminal prosecution,’ the standards in criminal cases have been examined to 
determine when waiver can occur.” (citations omitted)). 
 172. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(1) (2006). 
 173. For example, a defendant’s psychiatric evaluation could be probative of his or her ability 
to understand key facts in the case. 
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relevant to the determination of the competency of a party or the validity 
of a waiver.174 For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that 
when making determinations regarding a party’s waiver of the right to 
counsel, trial courts should consider “any physical or psychological disa-
bility which may significantly affect [a defendant’s] ability to communi-
cate a possible defense to the jury.”175 This factor would likely require 
extrinsic evidence to be considered, as the court would need access to 
expert diagnoses or medical records to be able to make a full, informed, 
and unbiased determination based on physical or psychological disabili-
ties. 
Although this allowance of extrinsic evidence appears expansive, it 
is limited in two important ways. First, the process for determining the 
competency of the defendant is subject to the court’s discretion.176 Thus, 
trial courts can, and presumably will, cut off the consideration of extrin-
sic evidence when they deem the evidentiary record sufficient. It is un-
likely that courts will entertain an endless parade of evidence to deter-
mine the competency of defendants to waive their right to counsel in a 
civil-commitment proceeding. To do so would effectively require de-
fendants to litigate the issue of their mental health twice: once for the 
competency determination and again for the civil-commitment petition. 
Expressly allowing courts to consider extrinsic evidence would provide 
them with the necessary information on which to base their determina-
tions while deferring to their judgment about the amount of evidence to 
entertain.177 
Second, prior determinations of competency and mental illness will 
often be irrelevant to current commitment proceedings. A frequent char-
acteristic of mental illness is that the symptoms do not remain static, and 
a person may be affected in varying degrees depending on the day, mi-
nute, or hour.178 Such volatility of state serves to render prior mental 
health diagnoses and court rulings largely irrelevant to a determination 
that is to be made with regard to the defendant’s current mental capaci-
                                                            
 174. See In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d at 689 (Trial courts should “consider whether there are any 
other facts relevant to resolving the issue.”); State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Wis. 1997). 
 175. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 724 (citing Pickens v. State, 292 N.W.2d 601, 611 (Wis. 1980)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. Alternatively, state legislatures can define the scope of extrinsic evidence to be consid-
ered. For example, in matters involving the defendant’s competence, California requires a psycho-
logical evaluation of the defendant and permits both parties to offer evidence, rebut each other’s 
evidence, and provide closing arguments. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1369(a)–(e) (West 2007). 
 178. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 175 (2008) (noting that mental illnesses vary both 
in degree and over time, affecting a person’s functioning “at different times and in different ways”). 
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ty.179 Additionally, Washington’s lack of a presumption of incompeten-
cy180 further renders such prior determinations moot, thereby serving to 
limit the evidence that trial courts should consider when determining if a 
defendant is competent to waive counsel. 
Because of the natural limitations placed on the use of extrinsic ev-
idence, trial courts should consider evidence that is necessary to create a 
sufficient record on which to base determinations of a defendant’s com-
petency to waive counsel. Consideration of such evidence will maximize 
a trial judge’s ability to accurately gauge a defendant’s competency at a 
particular moment by deferring to the court’s judgment as to what evi-
dence will better inform its opinion, which will help ensure just and fair 
rulings. 
C. Summary of Recommended Comprehensive Standard for 
Determination of Competency 
Based on the above discussion, trial courts, and particularly those 
within Washington State, should use the following colloquy to create a 
sufficient evidentiary record on which to base determinations of the 
competency of defendants to waive their right to counsel. Such a collo-
quy should be used in conjunction with a limited consideration of extrin-
sic evidence the court deems relevant to its determination of competency. 
A summary of this colloquy is also included for quick reference.181 
(1) Verification of the Defendant’s English Fluency and Literacy. 
The trial court should first seek to verify that the defendant is fluent in 
English by asking, “Can you hear and understand me?”182 This question 
will demonstrate for the record that the court’s subsequent questions are 
likely to be understood by the defendant. The court should then ask, “Are 
you able to read and write English?”183 These questions are solely to ver-
                                                            
 179. See Miller v. C.S. (In re Interest of C.S.), 713 N.W.2d 542, 549 (N.D. 2006), in which the 
court stated: 
[T]he capacity and competence of a respondent in mental health cases can potentially 
vary from one proceeding to the next. A respondent incapable of waiving counsel at one 
hearing may, due to treatment or other factors, gain that capacity by the next hearing. 
This, in part, is why [state law] forbids a presumption against a respondent’s legal capaci-
ty from arising simply due to previous mental health treatment. Similarly, a respondent 
who one time had the capacity to proceed pro se can, by the time of the next hearing, no 
longer possess this capacity. For this reason, the trial court must assess the validity of a 
waiver of counsel and competence to make that waiver before each proceeding during 
which the respondent wishes to represent himself. 
 180. WASH. REV. CODE § 71.05.360(1)(b) (2009). 
 181. See infra Appendix A. 
 182. See In re Watson, 706 S.E.2d 296, 304 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). 
 183. See, e.g., State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Wis. 1997). 
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ify for the record that the defendant understands the subsequent question-
ing. Courts cannot use defendants’ lack of fluency in English as a direct 
determiner of competency because they have a right to a qualified inter-
preter, if necessary.184 
(2) Description of the Defendant’s Rights. The court should verify 
that defendants understand that they have the right to effective counsel. 
Additionally, the court should ask if defendants understand that they may 
waive that right and exercise the right to self-representation if determined 
to be competent to do so, and if the waiver is determined to have been 
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. These disclosures will 
demonstrate for the record that defendants were apprised of their rights 
prior to waiver of counsel. 
(3) Description of Benefits Being Waived. The court should explain 
to defendants that if they decide to waive counsel and proceed pro se, 
they will be unable to receive direction or advice from the court regard-
ing how to try their cases.185 Each defendant should be reminded that the 
current proceeding is legally binding, and that it is the judge’s opinion as 
an attorney that a decision to waive the right to counsel is unwise. When 
outlining these hazards, courts should use language similar to that con-
tained within questions seven, nine, eleven, and twelve of the 
Benchbook’s recommended colloquy.186 Courts should also inform de-
fendants that they will be responsible for all aspects of presenting their 
                                                            
 184. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.43.010 (1989). 
 185. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.12.040(1) (2009) (“No judge of a superior court of the state of 
Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding [if] that said judge is prejudiced against 
any party or attorney, or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in such cause.”). 
 186. BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 6–7. The four questions from the Benchbook are as fol-
lows: 
7. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your own? I cannot tell 
you or even advise you how you should try your case. 
. . . . 
9. Do you understand that the rules of evidence govern what evidence may or may not 
be introduced at trial, that in representing yourself, you must abide by those very tech-
nical rules, and that they will not be relaxed for your benefit? 
. . . . 
11. Do you understand that [the] rules [of civil procedure] govern the way a [civil 
commitment] action is tried . . . , that you are bound by those rules, and that they will not 
be relaxed for your benefit? 
. . . . 
12. I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer would defend you far better 
than you could defend yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent yourself. 
You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not 
familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to represent yourself. 
Id. 
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cases, which includes conducting cross-examinations, calling witnesses, 
presenting evidence, and making closing arguments.187 
(4) Verification of the Defendant’s Understanding of the Proceed-
ings. The court should explain to the defendant the nature of the current 
proceedings and the length of commitment being sought by the state. 
This explanation serves as a substitute for standard questioning regarding 
the nature of the charges and the punishments faced in criminal proceed-
ings,188 and will demonstrate for the record that defendants were in-
formed of the types of proceedings that they face. 
(5) Determination of the Defendant’s Education Level. The trial 
court should ask the defendant, “What is your current level of educa-
tion?”189 While this question may not be allowed as a direct determiner 
of competency under Faretta,190 it does verify for the record that defend-
ants understand the proceedings and can communicate their cases.191 This 
question will also demonstrate for the record that defendants have re-
ceived a level of education that renders them likely to understand both 
the language used in court and the contents of legal documents. 
(6) Determination of the Defendant’s Legal Education and Experi-
ence. The court should then ask the defendant, “Do you have any prior 
legal education or experience that you wish to disclose to the court at this 
time?” This question places the decision to divulge legal expertise on the 
defendant, as an answer of “no” will not inform the court that the de-
fendant lacks such expertise.192 Because defendants are seeking to be 
found competent in order to waive counsel, they will likely divulge any 
legal expertise in support of their waivers. 
(7) Verification of the Voluntariness of Waiver. The court should 
then ask the defendant, “Is your decision to waive your right to counsel 
completely voluntary?”193 This question will provide some evidence for 
                                                            
 187. See In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
 188. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.77.020(1) (2006). 
 189. See, e.g., State v. Klessig, 564 N.W.2d 716, 724 (Wis. 1997). 
 190. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 833 n.43 (1975) (“‘Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law.’” (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932))). But see City of Bellevue v. Acrey, 691 P.2d 957, 962 (Wash. 1984) (noting 
that educational level is relevant but not dispositive when considering whether a valid waiver oc-
curred). 
 191. See Klessig, 564 N.W.2d at 724 (noting that the defendant’s educational level and literacy 
should be addressed on the record when determining the validity of a waiver of counsel). 
 192. This phrasing seeks to avoid the concerns raised by Faretta regarding the requirement of 
legal education to be competent to represent oneself by (1) making disclosure voluntary and (2) 
considering only affirmative answers. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (proclaiming technical legal 
knowledge as “not relevant to an assessment of [a defendant’s] knowing exercise of the right to 
defend himself”). 
 193. See BENCHBOOK, supra note 114, at 7. 
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the record that defendants are making voluntary waivers of their right to 
counsel. 
(8) Determination of the Defendant’s Reasons and Motivations for 
the Waiver. The court should ask the defendant, “What are your reasons 
and motivations for seeking to waive your right to counsel?”194 Courts 
should indulge detailed responses by defendants for the purpose of de-
veloping full evidentiary records that accurately reflect defendants’ men-
tal states at the time their waivers are sought. However, courts should not 
permit defendants to make incriminating statements unnecessarily or to 
otherwise undermine their cases.195 
(9) Description of the Availability of Standby Counsel. The court 
should explain to defendants that it has discretion to appoint standby 
counsel to provide legal advice to them. Defendants should be encour-
aged to request the appointment of standby counsel if they so desire. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Washington State currently operates under a heightened—albeit 
unarticulated—standard of competency to waive counsel that is in excess 
of traditional constitutional requirements.196 The Supreme Court’s hold-
ing in Edwards made it possible for state courts to employ standards for 
the determination of competency to waive counsel that are stronger than 
the traditional Dusky standard.197 Washington employs a two-step pro-
cess when making competency determinations,198 which is best served by 
using a single-step fact-finding inquiry that is based on an articulated and 
standardized colloquy. The fact-finding inquiry should also include a 
limited consideration of extrinsic evidence that the trial court deems rel-
evant to its determination of a defendant’s competency. Such a detailed 
fact-finding process will safeguard defendants’ rights while minimizing 
any chances of reversible error. 
                                                            
 194. See In re Jesse M., 170 P.3d 683, 689 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); see also State v. Chavis, 644 
P.2d 1202, 1206 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]rial courts should attempt to determine the subjective 
reasons for the defendant’s refusal [of counsel].”). 
 195. See generally Blume & Clark, supra note 61 (discussing trial court proceedings in which 
mentally ill defendants openly acted in a bizarre or disturbing manner). 
 196. See supra Part III. 
 197. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 178 (2008). 
 198. See supra Part IV. 
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APPENDIX A: JUDICIAL COLLOQUY FOR COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS 
DURING CIVIL-COMMITMENT PROCEEDINGS 
 
1. Can you hear and understand me? 
 
2. Are you able to read and write English? 
 
3. Do you understand that you have the right to counsel? 
 
4. Do you understand that you may waive that right, but only if I de-
termine that you are competent to do so and that your waiver is 
made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily? 
 
5. Do you understand that if you represent yourself, you are on your 
own? I cannot tell you or even advise you how you should try your 
case. 
 
6. Do you understand that the rules of evidence govern what evidence 
may or may not be introduced at trial, that in representing yourself, 
you must abide by those very technical rules, and that they will not 
be relaxed for your benefit? 
 
7. Do you understand that the rules of civil procedure govern the way 
a civil commitment action is tried, that you are bound by those 
rules, and that they will not be relaxed for your benefit? 
 
8. I must advise you that in my opinion, a trained lawyer would de-
fend you far better than you could defend yourself. I think it is un-
wise of you to try to represent yourself. You are not familiar with 
the law. You are not familiar with court procedure. You are not 
familiar with the rules of evidence. I strongly urge you not to try to 
represent yourself. 
 
9. Do you understand that you will be responsible for all aspects of 
your case, including presenting your case, conducting cross-
examinations, calling witnesses, presenting evidence, and making 
closing arguments? 
 
10. Do you understand that this proceeding is based on a petition for 
you to receive involuntary treatment for up to _________ days? 
 
11. What is your current level of education? 
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12. Do you have any prior legal education or experience that you wish 
to disclose to the court at this time? 
 
13. Is your decision to waive your right to counsel completely volun-
tary? 
 
14. What are your reasons and motivations for seeking to waive your 
right to counsel? 
 
15. Do you understand that the court has the discretion to appoint 
standby counsel to provide you with legal advice, and that you may 
request that the court appoint standby counsel if you so desire? 
 
